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JUVENILE LAW
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS
AND AGE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF USING
JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS TO ENHANCE ADULT
SENTENCES
INTRODUCTION
The same justice systems served juveniles and adults until the late
nineteenth century when society decided to protect child offenders' inno-
cence.' The decision to protect juvenile delinquents was based on the
premise that juvenile delinquents could be rehabilitated.2 The fundamen-
tal objective of the juvenile justice system was not to determine the guilt
or innocence of the juvenile, but rather to examine how the juvenile be-
came whom he or she is and what can be done in the best interest of the
child and the state to save him.3 Recently, however, public perceptions of
increasing crime rates and the belief that rehabilitation-based treatment
was neither efficient nor deserved influenced the juvenile justice system
to treat "delinquents less as misguided but redeemable individuals and
more as a faceless army of pint-sized criminals.",4 For instance, "in the
last four years, "there have been a total of six mass killings by juve-
niles."' Throughout the last decade alone, "the number of juveniles
committing murder, rape, robbery, and assault has increased by 93 per-
cent."6 However, in the last decade, fear of rising juvenile crime has pro-
1. Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Sentence Blending and The Promise of Rehabilitation: Bringing
the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259, 264 (2000). Individuals became
more concerned with protecting young offenders rather than punishing them. Id. This shift in
thinking was based on the belief that the "child's poor living environment, rather than willful
behavior, caused juvenile delinquency." Id.
2. See Danielle R. Oddo, Removing ConfidentialitY Protections and the "Get Tough"
Rhetoric. What Has Gone Wrong With the Juvenile Justice System?, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
105, 107 (1998). The commission of crimes by children was not the result of a decision by a morally
responsible individual; "rather it was a type of youthful illness which could be treated and the child
rehabilitated." Id. at 107.
3. Id.
4. Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the Preadolescent's
Best Defense in the Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 166-69, 175 (2000) (noting that "harsh
conditions and lack of services characteristic if youth prisons will not provide preadolescent
children, who are at a formative stage in their moral and cognitive development, with the educational
and therapeutic services necessary to lead law-abiding and productive lives upon release.").
5. Jennifer A. Chin, Baby-Face Killers: A C' v for Uniform Treatment for Youths Who
Murder, From Trial to Sentencing, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 287, 302 (1999). Because of this increase, or
perception of an increase, in violent crimes committed by juveniles, some critics argue for tougher
sanctions on juvenile murders. Id. at 302. But how should the juvenile justice system treat juveniles
who commit violent crimes but not murder'? This is an issue addresses by the Tenth Circuit in
Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999). See infra, notes 72-109.
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duced a wave of legislation affecting juveniles which has stated that
"children who commit serious crimes should be treated virtually the
same as adults."7 Also, when a case stays in juvenile court, the records of
the proceeding can be disclosed to public officials conducting criminal
8investigations.
Through an analysis of the Tenth Circuit's treatment of juvenile law
and sentencing law, this survey will discuss the sentencing of juveniles
with a focus on juveniles' constitutional rights. This survey will also
discuss the use of juvenile records in the sentencing of adult criminals.
Part I discusses Hawkins v. Hargett9 and the Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality test and its application to juveniles sentenced as adult criminals.
Part II examines United States v. McKissick ° and the use of juvenile
records in the sentencing of adult criminals. This survey evaluates the
recent trend in treating juveniles as adults and the future of the juvenile
justice system and juveniles' constitutional rights. This survey does not
reflect the entire body of juvenile law."
6. Charles J. Aron and Michael S.C. Hurley, Juvenile Justice at the Crossroads, Champion,
June 1998, at 1.
7. See Gregory Loken and David Rosettenstein. The Juvenile Justice System Counter-
Reformation: Children and Adolescents as Adult Criminals. 18 QLR 351, 352 (1999). The "get
tough" legislation falls into three main categories: transferring more juveniles to the adult criminal
justice system, "increasing the severity of juvenile sentences, and reducing the protections of
juvenile confidentiality." Oddo, supra note 2, at 113. Laws allowing for the transfer of juveniles to
adult courts expose the juvenile to longer incarceration periods with an emphasis on retribution. Id.
Measures have also been taken to increase juvenile sentences for both maximum and minimum
sentences. Id. at 114. Moreover, many states replaced "traditional confidentiality protections with
open proceedings and records." Id. at 115. Some of the changes caused by these new confidentiality
provisions may include: open proceedings to the public, some access to juvenile records, the release
of the juvenile's name and/or picture to the media or general public, and the use of the juvenile's
record in adult sentencing procedures. Id. at 116. See, e.g., Or. Laws ch. 422, sec. 48, codified at
Org. Rev. Stat. Sec. 161.290 (1997) (eliminating completely the defense of "incapacity due to
immaturity" for all persons age twelve or older); Kann. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-1602a(a), 1636(a)(1) (West
1998)(making children as young as ten years old subject to discretionary waiver to adult court for
any criminal offense); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-124(c-e) (1997)(allowing for the disclosure of the
records of juvenile court proceedings to public officials, to the victim, and to "any person who has a
legitimate interest in the information.") For a discussion about the transfer process See infra note 43.
8. Loken and Rosettenstein, supra note 7, at 352.
9. 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999).
10. 204 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2000).
11. This survey addresses decisions about the Eighth Amendment and its application to the
sentencing of juveniles and the use of prior juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences
rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit between September 1, 1999
and August 31, 2000.
2000] JUVENILE LAW
I. SENTENCING OF JUVENILES AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
PROPORTIONALITY TEST
A. History of the Juvenile Court System
Until recently, society treated juvenile offenders with rehabilitation
rather than severe punishment." Underlying that trend is the theory that
because children are of a tender age, less culpable, and able to change for
the better.' 3 The juvenile justice system began as part of "the efforts of
[p]rogressive reformers at the turn of the century."' 4 The reformers an-
ticipated a system that recognized the belief that children were different
from adults and needed protection and nurturing rather than absolute
accountability. 5 Thus, the juvenile justice system operated under the
idea that the state would act as parens patriae of the child and use its
judgment to do what is in the best interest of the child.'
6
1. Emergence of Juvenile's Rights
The juvenile justice system originally focused on rehabilitating chil-
dren because of the belief that children were responsive to treatment and
that treatment was essential.' 7 Based on these principles, juvenile court
proceedings were informal with the fatherly like judge, the friendly pro-
bation officer, and the juvenile and his parents having a conference to
12. Chin supra note 5. at 297. It was thought that a separate juvenile justice system
emphasizing rehabilitation would be more beneficial to the child and society. Id. The proceedings in
this system were less adversarial. Id. Juveniles were not offenders, but respondents, and attorney's
did not file charges, but instead filed petitions. Id. These systems were based on the assumption that
children were not criminally responsible for their behavior, and thus, could not be punished like
adult criminals. Id. at 298.
13. Id. at 295-296.
14. Martin L. Forst and Martha-Elin Blomquist. Cracking Down on Juveniles. Changing the
Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 323, 324 (1991). Some
commentators suggest that this system developed in response to the shift from a rural society to a
urban society which led to accompanying problems of modernization and immigration. See also
Deborah L. Mills, United States v. Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System
from Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 906 (1996). In an attempt to address
these problems, the Progressive reformers offered solutions to incorporating the changes in basic
family structure, family functions, and conceptions in childhood and social control. Id. at 907.
15. Forst & Blomquist, supra note 10, at 324. Essential to the reformers beliefs was the
assumption that children were not completely developed physically nor mentally and thus required
time to complete their "cognitive, social, and moral development before being expected to shoulder
the burden of adulthood." Id. "Juveniles were adjudicated 'delinquent' rather than found 'guilty,'
and a conviction did not send them to jail. Overall, the goal was to provide juveniles with services to
encourage rehabilitation and supervision to help them stay on the right path." Oddo, supra note 2, at
107.
16. Sarah M. Coupet, What to do with the Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The Role of Rhetoric and
Reality about Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the Juvenile Justice System. 148
U. P.A. L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2000). The concept of parens patriae refers to the role of the state as the
custodian of persons who suffer from some form of legal disability; it is this concept that "provides
the basis for state laws that protect rather than punish citizens." Id.
17. Oddo, supra note 2, at 107.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:2
discuss what would be in the child's best interest.18 But as the number of
juvenile offenders increased, providing individualized treatment was not
feasible or realistic.' 9 Eventually, lawyers, social workers, and child ad-
vocates raised concerns that the juvenile justice system was falling short
of its goals and that the lack of procedural rotections resulted in chil-
dren being unjustly and arbitrarily punished. 0 "Without right to notice,
counsel, or any of the basic protections provided to an adult criminal
defendant, a delinquent child often was j owerless to contest whatever
judgment the court saw fit to pronounce."
The Supreme Court responded to the emerging shortcomings of the
juvenile justice system in two significant cases. In Kent v. United
States, 23 the Supreme Court held that juveniles are entitled to a hearing
before transfer to adult criminal court and to the right to confer with
24counsel throughout the hearing process. The Court emphasized that, in
its view, the original purpose of rehabilitation and treatment of juvenile
offenders was not being achieved.25
Then, in In re Gault,26 the court expanded the definition of juvenile
rights by granting juveniles the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to
confrontation, to cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege
against self-incrimination. 27 In Gault, the Court reviewed the inadequa-
18. Smallheer, supra note 1, at 265.
19. Id. at 266. As a result of the increase in juvenile offenders, the system began either giving
juveniles a "slap on the wrist, or . . . sent to large congregate institutions, which could not possible
treat each juvenile on an individualized basis" and as a result many dispositions of juvenile cases
resembled dispositions of adult criminal cases. Id.
20. Id. at 267. See also Bazelon, supra note 4, at 173.
21. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 173. "Juvenile court-mandated 'placements' sometimes resulted
in terms of imprisonment that far outlasted the harshest sentence the child could have received upon
conviction in criminal court." Id.
22. Kent. v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, discussed infra notes 23-
30.
23. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Kent, age 14, was convicted of housebreaking and robbery, and
placed on probation. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. Two years later, Kent was taken into custody by the
police for robbing and raping a women. Id. The police interrogated him without the benefit of
counsel or his parents. Id. at 534-544. Kent was then sent to a Receiving Home for a week with no
hearing or arraignment. Id. at 544-45. The juvenile court waived jurisdiction without hearing and
without ruling on any of the motions filed by Kent's attorney. Id. at 546.
24. Id. at 561.
25. Id. at 556. According to the Court, juveniles adjudicated in the juvenile courts "receive the
worst of both worlds.., he gets neither the protections afforded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children." Id. See also Smallheer, supra note 1, at 268.
(discussing the shift of the juvenile justice system towards retributions and the constitutional
protections afforded to juveniles as a result of this shift).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault was fifteen years old when he was convicted of making obscene
phone calls. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-10. Gault was sent to the State Industrial School for a
maximum of six years by the juvenile court for being a "delinquent." Id. at 7-8.
27. Id. at 31-57.
JUVENILE LAW
cies of the traditional juvenile court proceedings and in its critique the
majority said:
Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discre-
tion, however benevolently motivated, and is frequently a poor sub-
stitute for principle and procedure.. the absence of substantive stan-
dard has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compas-
sionate, individualized treatment.
28
Both decisions emphasized the fact that the "juvenile courts had
failed to deliver on their promise of treatment, and instead were merely
providing punishment in the form of training schools or other types of
incarceration." 29 But, as constitutional rights were extended to juveniles,
the juvenile court system became more adversarial and more like the
adult criminal justice system.3 ° In fact, after the Gault era, fundamental
changes in sentencing of juveniles emerged as the focus shifted to con-
siderations of crime committed and retribution.31
Three years after Gault, in In re Winship,32 the court imposed a re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the juvenile court con-
victions of delinquent acts.33 The court reasoned that when a juvenile's
liberty is at stake, due process requires that the standard of evidence nec-
essary for conviction be as exacting as that applied in adult proceed-
ings. The dissenters in Winshop expressed concern that by mandating to
juveniles similar procedural due process protections afforded to adult
criminals, the Court would destroy the philosophy that warranted main-
taining a separate justice system for juveniles.35 Then, in Breed v.
Jones,36 the Court decided that juvenile courts must adhere to the double
jeopardy clause.37 Yet, the Court refused to apply the rationale of Gault
and Winship in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,38 and held that juvenile delin-
quents do not have a constitutional right to a trial by jury.39
28. Id. at 18-19.
29. Florence B. Bumstein, Tenth Circuit Survey Juvenile Law, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 877, 880
(1999). Thus, Kent and Gault transformed the juvenile justice system from a social welfare agency,
to a "wholly-owned subsidiary of the criminal justice system." Smallheer, supra note 1, at 269.
30. Smalheer, supra note 1, at 269.
31. Id.
32. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). In this case, a juvenile was found guilty of stealing money from
a women's purse based on a preponderance of evidence standard. Id. at 360.
33. 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) ("[Tlhe constitutional safeguards of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is as much required during the adjudicator stage of a delinquency proceeding as are those
constitutional safeguards applied in Gault").
34. Id.
35. Id. at 376. (Burger, J., dissenting).
36. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
37. Breed, 421 U.S. at 541.
38. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
39. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547.
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2. The Juvenile Justice Today: A Response to Juvenile Crime Rates
The social trend today is to treat juveniles as criminals because of the
atrocious crimes they commit.4 0 With the increase in violent crimes
committed by juveniles,4 ' legislators have shown a willingness to treat
juvenile offenders as adults.42 For example, new legislation allows for
the removal of juvenile offenders from the juvenile system and into the
adult criminal system through the process of transfer or direct filing. 4
Furthermore, many states have expanded the purpose clauses of their
juvenile codes to include the promotion of public safety, punishment, and
accountability. 44 "Few jurisdictions provide for an intermediary court
where juvenile sentencing may be more appropriate" .4  Juveniles in
"adult criminal court will be subject to the full range of adult punish-
ment, including life imprisonment and the death penalty.
46
"High profile cases and regular news reports of gang violence and
school shootings have solidified the public view that juvenile crime is
out of control., '47 "The period between 1985 to 1994 saw a 100% in-
crease in adolescent homicides, paralleled by a 100% increase in the
number of homicides by adolescents using guns." 48 Furthermore, juve-
nile violence has declined since the peak in 1994, although total arrests
40. Matthew Thomas Wagman,. Innocence Lost: In the Wake of Green: The Trend is Clear---
If You Are Old Enough To Do The Crime, Then You Are Old Enough To Do The Time. 49 CAT. U.
L. REV. 643,644 (2000).
41. According to the Uniform Crime Reports for 1995, over a five year period starting in 1991
juvenile arrests increased twenty percent, more than ten times that of adults. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 1995 Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime
Reports 207 (1996). These statistics also illustrated that the police arrested children between the ages
of thirteen and fourteen for forcible rape with greater frequency than most other age groups
considered juveniles. Id. at 218.
42. Loken and Rosettenstein supra note 7, at 355.
43. Id. "Transfer" of jurisdiction is the process of removal of juvenile offenders to the adult
judicial system. See Burnstein supra note 29, at 880. Transfer can occur if the juvenile court waives
jurisdiction or if a statute mandates immediate transfer depending on the type of crime. Id. The final
way a juvenile can be transferred is through direct filing by the prosecution. Id. Legislation may give
the prosecutor the discretion to file charges directly either in juvenile court or adult criminal court.
Id. "Today, most judicial transfer statutes include a list of criteria that a juvenile court judge is
allowed to consider or should consider in making a transfer determination." Lisa A. Cintron,
"Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court", 90
NW. U. L. R.ev. 1254, 1265 (1996).
44. Mabel Artega, Juvenile Justice with a Future for Juveniles, 2 CARDOZA WOMEN'S L.J.
215, 219 (1995). As the states changes the purpose of their juvenile codes the rehabilitative goals of
the juvenile justice system is becoming overshadowed. Id.
45. Bumstein, supra note 29, at 880.
46. Id. at 881.
47. See Elizabeth Cauffman, Jennifer Woolard. and N. Dickon Reppucci, Justice for
Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents Competence and Culpability, 18 QLR 403, 404 (1999)
(noting that regardless of the accuracy of this perception, the sentiment that the juvenile court was
too soft led to an introduction in many states of tougher policies for juvenile delinquents).
48. Cauffman supra note 18, at 403, citing Al Blumstein, Violence by Young People: Why the
Deadly Nexus?, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Aug. 1995, at 3.
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remain significantly higher than the rates in the 1980's and these trends
and media coverage of these trends have scared the public.49
Ironically, the public demand for adult treatment of adolescents did
not go beyond the area of retributive justice. 50 For instance, the Virginia
legislature "that lowered the age of transfer to fourteen years of age" also
prohibits children "under the age of eighteen from getting a tattoo with-
out permission from their parents because they are too immature to make
this type of decision on their own."'', These recent changes in the treat-
ment of juvenile delinquents raises concerns about the psychological and
developmental differences between adolescents and adults, specifically
in regards to adjudicative competence and culpability.52
3. The Eighth Amendment Gross Proportionality Test
The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted. In Weems v. U.S., the Court held that the Constitution re-
quires proportionality in sentencing. Thus, the Eighth Amendment be-
came a constitutional basis for "challenges to excessively harsh prison
sentences."
56
49. Id. at 403.
50. Id. at 404.
51. Id. See generally Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-371.3 (1999).
52. Cauffman supra note 48, at 405. Adjudicative competence refers to "the ability of a person
to consult with his or her lawyer and to have a rational and factual understanding of the court
proceeding." Id. "Culpability refers to the extent to which an individual can be held accountable for
his or her actions, and by extension, the degree to which retributive punishment is appropriate." Id.
For the purposes of this discussion on the Eighth Amendment proportionality, only culpability of
adolescents will be further explored.
53. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.
54. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The issue in this case was a disbursing officer's 15 year sentence to
"cadena temporal" for falsifying a cashbook for the port of Manilla in the Philippines. See id. at 357-
358. "Cadena" is defined as "an afflictive penalty consisting of imprisonment at 'hard and laborious
work,' originally with a chain hanging from the waist to the ankle and carrying with it the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction, perpetual absolute disqualification from office, and in the case of
'cadena temporal,' surveillance by the authorities during life." Black Law's Dictionary.
55. Weems, 217 U.S. at 368. Proportionality is the proposition that a punishment should not
exceed the guilt incurred by the commission of a particular crime, gauged by the heinousness of the
crime and the culpability of the offender. Chris Baniszewski, Supreme Court Review of Excessive
Prison Sentences: The Eighth Amendment's Proportionality Requirement, 25 ARIz. S.T. L.J. 929,
942 (1993).
56. Benjamin L. Felcher, Kids Get the Darndest Sentences: State v. Mitchell and Why Age
Should Be A Factor in Sentencing for First Degree Murder, 18 LAW & INEQ. 323, 332 (2000).
Eighth Amendment issues arise in three main circumstances: challenges to the death penalty,
challenges to the treatment of prisoners, and challenges to the length of prison sentences. Id. at FN
69. See Mirah Horowitz. Kids Who Kill: A Critigue of How the American Legal System Deals with
Juveniles Who Commit Homicide, 63 SuM. LAW CONTEMP. PROB. 133 (2000) (discussing the history
of the death penalty and the juvenile death penalty). The application of the Eighth amendment differs
depending upon the issue involved, thus this paper will focus solely upon the Court's decisions
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Three cases in which the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
meaning of the Eighth amendment are Gregg v. Georgia,57 Solem v.
Helm,58 and Harmelin v. Michigan.59 In Gregg, the court created a two-
prong test to determine whether a punishment is excessive within the
bounds of the Eighth Amendment.60 The first prong stated that, whatever
the punishment, it cannot involve unnecessary and unwarranted infliction
of pain.6' The second prong of the test outlined that the punishment in-
flicted must be in proportion to the crime committed.62
The Solem court expanded and clarified the second prong estab-
lished by the Gregg court.63 Relying on Gregg, the Solem court held that,
regardless of the crime, the sentence imposed must be in proportion to
the crime committed.64 The court stated that, if courts find it necessary to
conduct an Eighth Amendment analysis, they should be guided by an
objective analysis of the following factors: (1) the seriousness of the
crime as well as subsequent punishment, (2) how the state treats other
criminals, in order to determine whether or not criminals who commit
more serious crimes are subject to a less severe penalty, and (3) how
other jurisdictions adjudicate the crime.65 These factors should be viewed
"in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and
the culpability of the offender.
' 66
involving the duration of prison sentences and its application to juveniles specifically in the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999).
57. 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (holding that a death sentence for the crime of murder does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
58. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the court overturned a life sentence imposed upon a
defendant who was found guilty of his seventh felony, the last of which was forging a check. Id. at
281-82. In so holding, the court stated that although the judiciary must show substantial deference to
legislatures enacting sentencing schemes, the sentence must be proportionate to the crime
committed. Id. at 290.
59. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The Harmelin court modified the Eighth Amendment proportionality
principle and agreed that courts should use the Solem objective criteria analysis only in cases where
the defendant's sentence was "grossly disproportionate" to the offense. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
60. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See generally Solem, 463 U.S. 277. In Solem, the court reversed the imposition of a life
sentence without the possibility of parole for the cashing of a $100 check for which the defendant
did not have an account. Id. at 284. See also Felcher, supra note 56, at 331-338 (discussing the
history of the Supreme Court Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence).
64. Solem, 463 at 290.
65. Id. at 291-92. Based on those factors, the Court found the defendant's sentence
"significantly disproportionate his crime, and ... therefore prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."
Id. at 303.
66. Id. at 292. The majority supported the position that "as a matter of principle ... a criminal
sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted" with an
inquiry into the history of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 284-286. The Court stated
that the list of established principles was not exhaustive, but simply illustrative of generally accepted
criteria for comparing the severity of different crimes on a broad scale. Id. at 294.
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In Harmelin, the court rejected the Solem three-prong test for pro-
portionality. 67 The court modified the proportionality test and found that
it does exist in narrow circumstances. In sum, the law today states that
no defined proportionality between the crime and sentence mandated by
the Eighth Amendment exists, but rather the Eighth Amendment prohib-
its outrageous sentences, that are "grossly disproportionate.,
69
4. The Eighth Amendment Proportionality Test and Its Application
in the Sentencing of Juveniles in the Tenth Circuit: Hawkins v.
Hargett7°
a. Facts
Trent Hawkins, thirteen years and 11 months old, broke into a neigh-
bor's home, tied the neighbor up with ropes, blindfolded her, and then,
raped and sodomized her repeatedly.71 "Throughout the two and half-
hour episode, Mr. Hawkins threatened the victim with a knife and threat-
ened to kill her children if she told the police., 72 "After the sexual as-
sault, Mr. Hawkins took seven dollars from the victim's purse and
fled.",73 The court certified Mr. Hawkins to stand trial as an adult and the
Court of Appeals upheld that decision. 74 "A jury found Mr. Hawkins
guilty of first degree burglary, robber with a dangerous weapon, forci-
ble sodomy, and second degree rape.
b. Sentencing
"The jury sentenced Mr. Hawkins to maximum sentences of twenty
years for the burglary, twenty years for forcible sodomy, fifteen years for
rape, and up to forty-five years out of a possible life sentence for robbery
with a dangerous weapon., 76 "The trial judge ordered that Mr. Hawkins
serve the sentences consecutively, resulting in a total term of one hun-
67. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986-91 (1991). Harmelin was convicted of
possession of cocaine. Id. at 961. Harmelin argued that the mandatory life sentence could only be the
harshest of a series of penalties available to a sentencing court, imposed only after a determination
that such a sentence would not be grossly disproportionate to the particular crime and defendant. Id.
at 994-95.
68. Id. at 996-1009 (Kennedy. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
69. Id. at 1001. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
(emphasis added).
70. 200 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 1999).





76. Hawkins. 200 F.3d at 1280.
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dred years., 77 "The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Mr.
Hawkins' convictions and sentences. 78
Mr. Hawkins filed an application for post-conviction relief in state
court and argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.79 The
court denied relief, and the state court of criminal appeals affirmed.8 ° Mr.
Hawkins then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. 8'
The federal court referred the petition to a magistrate judge for a propor-
tionality review.82 "The Magistrate's report and recommendations in-
cluded a detailed proportionality review and recommended denying Mr.
Hawkins' petition. 83 The district court adopted the recommendation and
affirmed the lower court decision, and then Mr. Hawkins appealed.84 Mr.
Hawkins asked that the Tenth Circuit "examine whether the consecutive
sentences were constitutionally disproportionate in light of the fact that,
at the time he committed the crimes, he was only thirteen years old. 85
c. The Eighth Amendment Proportionality Test
First, the court held that the Eighth Amendment proportionality test
set forth in Harmelin was applicable. 86 After discussing Solem and Har-
melin, the court concluded that the Harmelin test was applicable because
"Justice Kennedy's opinion was the controlling position of the court
since his opinion both retains proportionality and narrows Solem."
87
Thus, the court proceeded to review Mr. Hawkins' sentence in relation to
his crimes for "gross disproportionality.,
88
Mr. Hawkins urged the court "to consider his youth at the time of
the crimes as a mitigating factor." 89 The court held that "[t]he chrono-
logical age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in determin-
ing whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate in as much as it
relates to culpability." 90 Culpability is "weighed by examining factors
such as the defendant's motive and level of scienter, among other
77. Id.; Hawkins v. State, 742 P.2d 33 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987)
78. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1280.





84. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1280.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1282.; McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535 (11 th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992); McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.
1992).





things."91 The court recognized the Supreme Court's indication "that the
age of a young defendant is relevant, in the Eighth Amendment sense, to
his culpability. 92 In Thompson v. Oklahoma,9 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult."
94
In State v. Green,95 the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that,
"while the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be con-
sidered in determining whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate
to the crime, the court's review is not limited to that factor., 96 In that
case, the court upheld a mandatory life sentence for a thirteen-year-old
convicted rapist. Similarly, the court held that "age is a relevant factor
to consider in a proportionality analysis. 98 However, the conclusion by
the court to consider Mr. Hawkins' age did not lead the court to find Mr.
Hawkins' sentence "grossly disproportionate" to his crimes.99 The court
emphasized the seriousness of Mr. Hawkins' crimes.1° The crimes in-
volved "a deadly weapon, a home invasion, threats of violence, and re-
peated sexual attacks."' '° "Although his culpability may be diminished
somewhat, due to his age at the time of his crimes," the court stated that
the sentence is more than "counterbalanced by the harm Mr. Hawkins
caused to his victim.
' 0 2
Furthermore, the court underscored the fact that the length of sen-
tence can change considerably by the availability of parole and "good
time" credits.10  The court had previously held that "the availability of
91. Id.; Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293-294, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983).
92. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1283.
93. 487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed.2d 702 (1988).
94. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 101 L. Ed.2d 702 (1988). A
15-year-old participated in the brutal murder of his brother in law who had been beating his sister.
Id. at 816. The court convicted the boy of first degree murder and sentenced him to death. Id. On
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the sentence stating that the imposition of the
death penalty against the defendant would violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the
Eighth amendment because of the boys age at the time of the offense. Id.
95. 348 N.C. 588, 502 S.E.2d 819 (1998).
96. Green, 348 N.C. at 609-610. "North Carolina is among the minority states that allow for
juvenile offenders to be transferred to adult criminal court for adjudication." See Wagman, supra
note 40, at 654. In State v. Green, Andre Green was arrested and convicted for raping a twenty-
three-year-old woman. See Green, 348 N.C. at 593-96. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the sentence was not contrary to societal standards of decency, the sentence was not disproportionate
to the crime committed, and that a mandatory life sentence was not cruel and/or unusual punishment.
Id. at 602-03. The court held that crime transcended the realm of crimes usually committed by
children and that because the court considered Green unamendable to treatment that an adult
sentence was the only appropriate remedy for the victim and the state. Id. at 610.
97. Green, 348 N.C. at 609-612.
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parole is relevant to determining whether the length of a sentence vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment"1°4 Mr. Hawkins had already finished his
sentences for the rape and sodomy convictions. 0 5 The court pointed out
that Mr. Hawkins would "serve a total of thirty-five years for all four
convictions combined, and would be eligible for parole in approximately
fifteen years."' 1 6 Furthermore, the court noted that the sentences met the
"permissible statutory range for the offenses he committed."'
10 7
The court concluded that, "in the light of Mr. Hawkins' crimes, the
Supreme Court's benchmarks, and the legislature's proper role in setting
sentencing ranges," that Mr. Hawkins' one hundred year sentence with
the possibility of parole was not grossly disproportionate to the four vio-
lent acts that he committed, nor did it violate "evolving standards of de-
cency" simply because the defendant was thirteen years old at the time of
the offense. 0
B. Other Circuits
Other circuits also deal with the proportionality issue in the context
of youthful defendants given statutorily mandated sentences. 19 In Harris
v. Wright,"10 the defendant was fifteen years old when he committed ag-
gravated first-degree murder and received that state's mandatory sen-
tence of life without parole."' The defendant argued that his sentence
was "grossly disproportionate" to a fifteen-year-old's limited culpability
for any crime. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that it had no
power to reverse the state legislature's decision on the matter. 113
In Rice v. Cooper, 114 the Seventh Circuit decided that life without pa-
role was not a disproportionate punishment for a sixteen-year-old men-
tally retarded boy who killed four people."15 Although the court stated
104. Id.
105. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1284.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1285.
109. See infra, notes 110-119.
110. 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996).
111. Harris, 93 F.3d at 581. The court stated that the sentence was consistent with the evolving
standards of decency and that at least twenty-one other states allowed life without parole sentences
to be mandatory imposed on fifteen year olds. Id. at 583-586.
112. Harris, 93 F.3d at 584.
113. Id.
114. 148 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1998).
115. Rice, 148 F.3d at 747. The boy, who was encouraged by two friends, tossed a bottle of
gasoline into an apartment building. Id. at 749. "The bottle exploded setting a fire that killed four
residents of the building." Id. The boy was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to a
natural life in prison. Id. In upholding the sentence, the court examined the fact that the United States
Supreme Court had rejected the argument that mandatory life sentences, including mandatory life
without the possibility of parole, are unconstitutionally just because they prevent the consideration of
mitigating factors such as age. Id. at 752.
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that the defendant's youth argued for a lighter sentence, it found that the
statutorily mandated sentence of life without parole was not dispropor-
tionate to the crime. 116
Some circuits determined that the availability of parole should fore-
close proportionality review altogether, reasoning that any sentence less
than life without parole can never be "grossly disproportionate." 7 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit refused to go that far." 8 It recognized the avail-
ability of parole as a relevant consideration but refused to make it a dis-
positive factor.' 19
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Hawkins is consistent with the recent
trend to treat juvenile criminals as adults. 20 Juvenile justice, as it is cur-
rently practiced, "imposes two significant costs on American youth."'
12'
First, the juvenile court itself no longer fulfills its promise of rehabilita-
tion. 22 Second, courts, corrections, and other youth serving agencies are
allowed to ignore the inherent youthfulness of many defenders now de-
fined as adults. 23 Thousands of fourteen and fifteen-year-olds are "re-
moved to criminal courts every year to be treated just like any other
adult." 24 Furthermore, "[t]he use of structured sentencing fundamentally
contradicts the basic premise of juvenile justice by making sentence
length proportional to the severity of the offense rather than basing court- , ,,125
outcomes on the characteristics and life problems of the offenders.
"The public's widespread and angry sentiment toward young of-
fenders has fueled the most recent demands for reforming the juvenile
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the court
will not "engage in a proportionality analysis except in cases where the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole"); United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th
Cir. 1995) (holding that "It is well settled that proportionality review is not appropriate for any
sentence less than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole) ; United States v. Meirovitz,
918 F. 2d 1376, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 1990) (The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and sentenced to life without parole.
After conducting the three factor Solem analysis, the court concluded that the defendant's life
sentence without parole, although harsh, did not violate the proportionality requirement of the Eighth
amendment.).
118. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1284.
119. Id.
120. See infra notes 109-119.





125. Id. at 55. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The dissent in this case
noted that merely because a state permits juveniles to be prosecuted as adults it does not necessarily
follow that the legislature deliberately concluded that it would be appropriate to impose capital
punishment on juveniles.
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justice system.,, 12' However, contrary to popular belief, juvenile crime is
not rising out of control. 127 The Bureau of Justice Statistics' National
Crime Victimization Survey indicates that, between 1993 and 1997, seri-
ous violence by juveniles dropped by thirty-three percent. 2 8 Although
incidences of violent juvenile crime continue to capture headlines, the
majority of juvenile court cases involve nonviolent property offenses.
129
The Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion reported in 1996 that only a fraction of youth are arrested for violent
crimes each year.1
30
Juvenile justice policies are cyclical in nature with polices "shaped
directly by changing social responses to juvenile crimes and rhetoric
about iuvenile delinquency, rather than by actual increases in criminal-
ity." 3 This vicious cycle of constantly changing juvenile justice policy
begins when officials and the general public believe that juvenile crime
is high, and the result is a shift towards harsher punishment. 32 A more
balanced approach to fighting juvenile crime than just treating juvenile
offenders like adults is needed. A more sensible approach is to incorpo-
rate both offender and offense-focused factors in accountability, public
safety, and competency development, while delivering appropriate con-
sequences for delinquent conduct and maintaining a focus on long-term
objectives for offenders. 133 This balanced approach improves the current
system by including restorative principles and, at the same time, pre-
serving the original intent of those who created a separate system for
children. 3 4 A restorative system allows for recognition "that violations
126. Coupet, supra note 16, at 1330.
127. Id.
128. Statistical Briefing Book. Online. Available.
http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/qal35.html.30 September 1999. Furthermore, "[tihe rate at which
juveniles committed aggravated assaults declined 33% between 1994 and 1995 and remained
relatively stable thereafter." Id. "The number of robberies by juveniles rose in 1981 and 1993, but by
1997, had dropped below the rates seen in the 1970's." Id.
129. Carol S. Stevenson et al., The Juvenile Court. Analysis and Recommendations, Future of
Children, Winter 1996, at 7 ("Although violent juvenile crime grab headlines, the bulk of the court's
delinquency work is in the handling of a large volume of crimes against property such as larceny,
vandalism, and motor vehicle theft.").
130. Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Combating
Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan 1 (1996). "Juveniles are
responsible for a far greater share of all property crime arrests (33 percent) than either violent crime
arrests (18 percent) or drug arrests (8 percent)." Id. "In 1993, the highest percentage of juvenile
arrest, compared to adults, was for arson (49 percent), vandalism (45 percent), and motor vehicle
theft (44 percent). Id.
131. Coupet, supra note 16, at 1328.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1341.
134. Id.at 1342.
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create obligations and these obligations are bilateral-the offender must
acknowledge and take responsibility to both victims and offenders.' 35
In fact, statistics have shown the failure of harsher punishments to
deter juvenile crime.' 36 For instance, a 1986 New York study found that,
for juveniles transferred to adult court at the onset, the likelihood of con-
tinued involvement in criminal activity once they were back on the
streets increased. 137 Furthermore, a study in Idaho concerning the deter-
rent effect of their transfer statute reached the conclusion that waivers to
adult court neither deter juvenile crime nor lower the rate of violent ju-
venile crime.' 38 Other research indicates that juveniles incarcerated with
adults may actually become more violent as a reaction to the violence
they regularly experience in prison.' 39 The transfer of juveniles to the
adult system is incapacitating a system already overwhelmed with too
many adult offenders. 140 Also, juveniles in adult prisons are more likely
to be victims of sexual assault, beatings by staff, and attacks with weap-
ons than those in juvenile centers.
141
Transferring juveniles to adult court appears to lack consistent de-
terrent effects, and incarcerating them seems equally ineffective. 42 Even
though the United States permits the execution of individuals for murders
committed as juveniles, 4 3 "the United States continues to have one of the
135. Id. at 1341. Restorative justice focuses on relationships as well as individuals with the aim
of justice on promoting the healing of and the relationships of the victims, community, and
offenders. Id.
136. See infra notes 135-139.
137. Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine That Arrived At The Wrong Station: How To Get
Juvenile Justice Back On The Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401,422 (1999).
138. Id. at 423.
139. Id. at 426.
140. Id.at 423. This results in the need to build more prisons which is a cost absorbed by
society. See id. at 425. "In 1994, taxpayers spent an average of $23,000 per year to keep a person in
prison and approximately $70,000 per year to keep a prisoner in maximum security." Id. Because of
this "get tough" policy, "the United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the world with a
prison population growth rate that is ten times more likely that that of the general population." Id. at
424.
141. Zierdt supra note 137, at 423.
142. Id. at 421. See also Smallheer, supra note 1, at Fnl06 (noting that according to Juvenile
Justice Reform Initiatives in the States, from 1994-1996, studies confirm that juveniles transferred to
adult criminal court have higher recidivism rates than juvenile offenders retained in juvenile court
and that juveniles prosecuted as adults are more likely to re-enter society as criminals rather than as
rehabilitated than their cournter-parts retained in juvenile court). See also, Cathi J. Hunt, Juvenile
Sentencing. Effects of Recent Punitive Sentencing Legislation on Juvenile Offenders and a Proposal
for Sentencing in the Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 621, 656 (1999) (discussing
additional studies that support the assertion that punitive legislative responses to juvenile offender
does not meet its deterrence goals). See also Forst and Bloomquist, supra note 14, at 362 (stating
that "[e]ven long periods of confinement in juvenile facilities are of questionable utility. Although
on a lesser scale than prisons, violence and intimidation also occur in training schools. Moreover, all
too often juvenile institutions simply warehouse youths.).
143. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the imposition of capital
punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.).
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highest rates of adolescent homicides," which serves as "further proof
that even the most severe deterrence based reforms have failed to signifi-
cantly reduce juvenile criminal activity." 44 Although "transferring juve-
niles to the adult court system is the mostly widely used method of in-
creasing severity of sanctions for youth offenders," a more balanced ap-
proach is the use of blended sentencing.145 "Instead of choosing between
sentencing a juvenile in adult or juvenile court, a judge may draw upon
both systems."'
146
Typical sentence blending allows "a juvenile court judge to impose
both a juvenile disposition and a stayed adult criminal sentence upon a
conviction of a juvenile offender."' 47 "If the juvenile offender fails to
conform to the requirements of the juvenile disposition, the stay of the
adult criminal sentence may be revoked and the juvenile may be trans-
ferred to an adult correctional facility." 48 Sentence blending extends
juvenile court jurisdiction into criminal court and is designed to give the
juvenile a wake-up call and one last chance to change his criminal be-
havior. 149 Currently, in the juvenile justice system, the judge can either
retain the juvenile and in his discretion impose a mandatory minimum
sentence or even a more severe sentence, or he can transfer the juvenile
to adult court where the juvenile will be susceptible to adult sentencing
procedures.150 While the present choice offers judges an all-or-nothing
approach (juvenile court or adult court), sentence blending is an effort at
integrating rehabilitation with accountability.''"'
Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges brought by juveniles
against sentences, such as life without parole, have met "limited success
in state courts and no success in the federal system."' 152 Juveniles, who
144. Id.
145. Butts, supra note 121, at 54.
146. Id.
147. Smallheer, supra note 1 at 275.
148. Id.
149. David Holmstrom, Punishment Alone Fails to Contain Juvenile Crime, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 9, 1998. at 13.
150. See generally, Hunt, supra note 143.
151. Smallheer supra note 1, at 276.
152. Wayne A. Logan, Article. Proportionality and Punishment: Proposing Life Without
Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 684 (1998). See Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding a life without parole sentence of a 15-year-old convicted of aggravated first
degree murder); See also State v. Foley, 456 So. 2d 979 (La. 1984) (upholding a sentence of life
without parole at hard labor for a 15-year-old convicted of aggravated rape); State v. Moore, 906
P.2d 150, 153-54 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) (noting that consideration must be given to the youth and
immaturity of the offender, but concluding that a term of 25 years to life imposed on a 14-year-old
for first degree murder of a police officer was not disproportionate); State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636,
642-43 (denying the challenge brought by a 15-year-old against a mandatory life without parole
sentence for two counts of murder, noting the age of the victim); Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546,
568 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing to consider the age of the 15-year-old defendant in challenge to life
without parole sentence); State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 989 (Del. 1976) (affirming sentence of life
without parole and stating that the defendant's youth is irrelevant); State v. Douglas, 216 Wis. 2d
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are at least sixteen years of age at the time of their crimes, can be sen-
tenced to the death penalty, and just short of that, juvenile offenders may
receive society's "penultimate punishment of life without parole."'
53
Traditionally, the justice system accorded special treatment to juve-
niles. 1 54 Thus, the judiciary should be sensitive to their youth, back-
ground and culpability when sentencing them as adults.15 A sentence
that is not "grossly disproportionate" for an adult may be so for a juve-
nile.1 56 It is a basic reality that juveniles differ from adults in fundamen-
tal ways. 157 Many young offenders have intellectual deficits, learning
problems or psychopathology.1 58 Juveniles are simply not as able to
make sound judgments concerning many decisions. 59 The National
Mental Health Association states that up to seventy percent of children in
the juvenile justice system suffer from mental or emotional disorders.'
6
0
Arguably, youth may commit crimes due to deficiencies in psychosocial
factors that adversely affect judgment which weakens the presumption of
autonomy, free will, and rational choice-all attributes which criminal
adult responsibility is based.16 1 Psychological and scientific data support
the idea that young children process information markedly differently
from adults.162 Furthermore, research indicates that children from under-
privileged backgrounds "have underdeveloped cognitive skills and are
more likely to adopt the inappropriate norms that they experience every-
day."' 163 Often mental health experts testify "that preadolescent children
114, 1997 WL 757701, at 4* (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)(denying proportionality claim of a 15-year-old
against a sentence that extended beyond his natural life, the court was not persuaded that based on
the petitioner's age alone, the parole eligibility date is excessive or constitutes cruel of unusual
punishment).
153. Logan, supra note 153, at 689.
154. See e.g. Smallheer, supra note 1: Oddo, supra note 2.
155. Logan, supra note 153, at 709.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 398 (1998) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing and
discussing studies done on juvenile death row inmates indicating high rates of psychological,
intellectual, and emotional disabilities). See generally Thomas Grisso, The Competence of
Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL"Y & LAW 3 (1997)(providing extensive
overview of relevant studies regarding a child's capacity). See, e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49, 54 (1962) (A 14 year old boy, no matter how sophisticated is unlikely to have any conception of
what will confront him).
159. Logan, supra note 152, at 709.
160. Holmstrom, supra note 149, at 12.
161. Cauffman, supra note 47, at 416.
162. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 157 (1997). A
recent study on the ability of juveniles to understand their privilege against self-incrimination found
that children aged 10 to 12 understood their rights no better than mentally retarded adults and
significantly less well than their 13 to 15 year old counterparts. See Grisso, supra note 158, at 12.
163. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 189. "[W]hile most preadolescents struggle to learn the
reasoning and analytical skills necessary to make moral choices meaningful.. children from
disadvantaged backgrounds tend to struggle harder, and with less success." Id. For instance, "in a
20001
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have a limited capacity to appreciate the irreversibility of their actions or
pinpoint why their behavior is criminal."'
' 64
Even the Supreme Court noted that "less culpability should attach to
a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed
by an adult."' 165 The Supreme Court also indicated that, because of the
special qualitative characteristics of juveniles, this justifies legislatures to
treat them differently from adults, which is relevant to Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality analysis. 1
66
The decision to commit a crime involves the consideration of po-
tential consequences, and most states enforce laws, such as the legal
drinking age, legal driving age, voting rights, and curfews "based on the
recognition that children do not possess the same decision-making ca-
pacity as adults."'' 67 "This legal recognition of a child's limited ability to
make informed decisions should apply with equal force to the way soci-
ety responds to children who have exercised that limited choice-making
faculty to commit a crime.' '168 Age, per se, should not be determinative
of proportionality because some juveniles are capable of moral culpabil-
ity.69 But age should be a trigger for heightened proportionality analysis,
"requiring a special vigilance" among courts with "respect to the back-
ground and traits of the young offender to ensure the presence of the
culpability prerequisite to the sentence of life without parole."'
170
study of fourteen juveniles on death row, twelve had been brutally abused physically and five had
been sodomized by older family members." Horowitz, supra note 56. at 157.
164. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 189.
165. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 854 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. Felcher, supra note 56, at 347-348. No state allows minors under age Eighteen to vote or
to sit on a jury. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 394 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Only
four states allow minors under Eighteen to marry without parental consent; only fourteen states
allow minors to consent to medical treatment; and forty-two states prevent minors from purchasing
pornographic material. See id. According to Justice Brennan, these restrictions placed on minors
reflect "the simple truth derived from communal experience that juveniles as a class have not the
level of maturation and responsibility that we presume in adults and consider desirable for full
participation in the rights and duties of modem." Id. at 395. See also, Horowitz, supra note 56
(discussing the failure of the criminal justice system to recognize the fundamental differences
distinguishing juveniles from adults and how that difference reduces culpability of juvenile
offenders).
168. Felcher, supra note 56, at 347-348.
169. Logan. supra note 152, at 723.
170. Id. See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 853 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Proportionality requires a nexus between the punishment imposed and the defendant's
blameworthiness."); see also Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 946 (Nev. 1989)("In deciding
whether the sentence [LWOP imposed on a 13-year-old] exceeds constitutional bounds it is
necessary to look at both age of the convict and at his probable mental state at the time of the
offense."). See also, Forst and Bloomquist, supra note 14, at 367 (stating that "age per se should be a
legally relevant variable in any consideration of capacity to violate the criminal law as well as
responsibility for criminal activity.").
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II. SENTENCING AND REDUCED CONFIDENTIALITY OF JUVENILE COURT
PROCEEDINGS AND RECORDS
A. Background
1. Right to Confidentiality
Based on the theory that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal
in nature, the courts established only basic procedural rights for juve-
niles.'17 Some decisions have broadened juveniles' due process rights, but
the Supreme Court has failed to grant juveniles constitutional protections
equivalent to those granted to adults. For instance, in In re Gault,
173
the court stated that the Constitution requires that fourteenth amendment
due process guarantees apply to juvenile proceedings. 174 Yet, the court
still maintained discretion in some other areas such as sentencing. 175
Judges could consider the juvenile's race, sex, home environment, and
other factors not considered in adult cases.
176
Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial
jury in all criminal prosecutions, 177 the Supreme Court also failed to
grant juveniles the constitutional right to jury trials. 78 In McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 79 the Court, in a plurality opinion, refused to extend the
juvenile due process rights established in Gault to include the right to a
171. Coupet, supra note 16, at 1314. The atmosphere and organization of the juvenile justice
system was intended to give an impression of concern. See Smallheer, supra note 1, at 265. The
focus was on acting in the best interest of the child-not obtaining convictions or adjudicating the
child guilty or innocent. See id. Because the court operated more like a social agency than a criminal
court and sought to rehabilitate the juvenile, constitutional protections were not deemed necessary.
See id.
172. Hunt, supra note 143, at 678. In Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789. 794 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989), the court summarized the Eighth main cases that explained juvenile ights: (1) protection
against coerced confessions, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); (2) procedural requirements for
certification hearings, Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966); (3) the fights of notice, counsel,
confrontation, cross-examination, and protection against self-incrimination, In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); (4) proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winshop, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); (5) that a jury trial
is not required, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); (6) double jeopardy protections,
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); (7) the validity of pre-trial detention, Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 (1984); and (8) a diminished Fourth Amendment standard applicable to school searches,
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
173. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
174. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-30.
175. David Dormont, For the Good of the Adult: An examination of the Constitutionality of
Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1779-81
(1991).
176. Id. at 1780.
177. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). In Duncan, the Court held that the fight to
a jury trial in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. Id.
178. Dormant, supra note 175, at 1780-1786 (discussing the right to jury trial as it applies to
adults and juveniles).
179. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Sixteen-year-old McKiever was charged with robbery, larceny, and
receiving stolen goods. Id. at 534. The court denied his request for a jury trial at his adjudication
hearing. Id. at 535.
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jury trial. 80 Although the court recognized serious shortcomings in the
juvenile justice system, the Court emphasized that a jury is not necessary
for accurate fact-finding in the context of a juvenile proceeding and that
other procedural rights adequately protected the accused juvenile.' 8'
"Almost all juvenile court proceedings and records remained confi-
dential as recently as the 1960's.,,182 Confidentiality comprised a critical
part of the juvenile justice system based on the idea that labeling a "ju-
venile as a law violator would stigmatize a young person."'' 83 But during
the 1980's and 1990's, "support for confidentiality protections began to
erode." 184 Nearly all states now allow juvenile fingerprints to be included
in criminal history records and authorization of juveniles to be photo-
graphed for later identification. 85 "In addition, many states enacted laws
that required juvenile records to remain open longer or prevent the seal-
ing or destruction of juvenile records altogether, typically those involv-
ing violent or serious offenses."'
186
2. Use of Juvenile Records in Sentencing
"Some states have even passed laws enabling juvenile court records
to affect criminal court sentences." 87 At least twenty states allow for the
use of juvenile adjudications to enhance adult criminal sentences.
88
Thus, "adjudication in juvenile court begins to entail potentially serious
jeopardy for youth."'' 89 Laws or statutes that permit such practices allow
juvenile offense histories to serve as sufficient grounds for increasing
180. McKiever, 403 U.S. at 545.
181. Id. at 547.




186. Id. Since 1992, "several states have passed legislation that gives the general public and/or
media access to the name and address of a minor adjudicated delinquent for specified serious or
violent crimes." OJJDP Research Report: State Response to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime,
p.75 (1996) " In all, 39 states permit the release of a juvenile's name and/or picture to the media or
general public under certain conditions." Id. "From 1992 through 1995, several states enacted or
modified their statutes with respect to notice to schools." Id. at 79. "As of 1995, 25 states had
statutes or court rules that either increase the number of years for which a serious and violent
offender's records must remain open or prohibit sealing or expungement of the record." Id. at 85.
See Oddo, supra note 2, at 115.
187. Butts, supra note 121, at 55.
188. Sara E. Kropf, Note: Overturning McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: The Unconstitutionality of
Using Prior Convictions to Enhance Adult Sentencing Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2149, 2175 (1999).
189. Butts, supra note 121, at 55. For instance, Illinois and Indiana allow past juvenile offenses
to serve as sufficient grounds for increasing the lengths of sentences or imposing consecutive
sentences. Id. Furthermore, California, Louisiana, and Texas allow the use of juvenile adjudications
to serve as the first and second strikes against an adult offender. Id. Thus, in these states, a juvenile
offender with two prior juvenile court adjudications could face life in prison for a first appearance in
adult criminal court. Id.
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sentence length or imposing first and second "strikes" against an adult
offender.'90 Thus, an offender with two prior juvenile adjudications could
face life in prison for a first appearance in adult criminal court.
191
Despite the case law prohibiting the use of prior uncounseled con-
victions, federal courts must include prior juvenile adjudications in adult
sentencing calculations. 92 Federal courts generate their sentencing de-
terminations with guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission.' 9 The core of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines) 194 is a sentencing table, consisting of forty-three base of-
fense levels and six criminal history categories, identifying the applicable
sentencing range for offenders. 95 According to the Guidelines, assign-
ment to the highest criminal history category, level VI, includes those
classified as career offenders. 96 Juvenile defendants, those Eighteen
years of age at the time of offense, who commit crimes of violence or
controlled substance offenses and have at least two similar prior felony
convictions, are then career offenders.197 The Guidelines treat prior sen-
tences, imposed in related cases, as one sentence for purposes of calcu-
lating the criminal history category. 198 Points are based on the length of
the sentence imposed for the prior sentence rather than on the severity or
nature of the offense. 199 The reason for enhancing sentences through this
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Robert E. Shepard, Trying Juveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM. JUST. 45, 47 (1994).
193. Paul M Winters, et al., Project: Twenty-Jburth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:
United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1993-1994 Sentencing Guidelines, 83 GEO. L.J.
1229, 1229 (1995).
194. United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual section
Ch.l, Pt.A(4)(h) (1999) [hereinafter U.S.S.G]. The Guidelines are applicable to all offenses
committed on or after November 1, 1987. U.S.S.G. Ch.l, Pt.A(l). When a defendant is convicted in
federal court, the judge must impose a sentence based on the Guidelines in effect at defendant's
sentencing date. ld.at Section lB 1.11.
195. The vertical axis of the Sentencing Table is the base offense level. Id. at Ch.5, Pt. A. The
criminal history category constitutes the borizontal axis of the table. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A. The judge
determines the appropriate category by totaling the number of criminal history points calculated in
the pre-sentencing report. Id. section 4A 1.1. The points start at zero and have no upper limit. Id. See
Sentencing Table. A defendant with 13 or more points have a criminal category of VI, regardless if
their point total is 14 or 43. Id. at Ch.3, Pt.A.
196. U.S.S.G. section 4BI.I.
197. Winters et al., supra note 192, at 1244.
198. U.S.S.G. section 4AI.2. In regards to offenses committed prior to age eighteen section
4A1.2(d) of the Guidelines reads: (1) If the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3 points under section 4AI. l(b)
for each such sentence. (2) In any other case, (A) add 2 points under section 4A 1.1(b) for each adult
or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days of the defendant was released from such
confinement within five years of his commencement of the instant offense; (B) add I point under
section 4A1.l(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's
commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A). Id.
199. Id. at Sec. 4A 1.1. Three points are added for each prior sentence exceeding one year and a
month in length regardless of whether the prior offense was forgery, drug dealing, or murder. Id.
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method is because the Sentencing Commission "sought to punish recidi-
vism and to protect the public from future criminal behavior.
200
3. Use of Juvenile Records in Sentencing in the Tenth Circuit:
United States v. McKissick2 °1
a. Facts
On December 7, 1997, a shooting took place in the parking lot of a
nightclub in Oklahoma City.202 The police arrested Mr. McKissick and
Mr. Ziegler, the suspects, for discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle
shortly after the shooting.20 3 The police also found cocaine in Mr.
McKissick's car and cocaine on Mr. Ziegler.204 The trial court convicted
Mr. McKissick of being a felon in possession of firearm, possession of
crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and use of a firearm during, and in
relation to, a drug offense.20 5 The court convicted Mr. Ziegler of crack
cocaine possession.20 6 Both defendants appealed.20 7 In relation to the
sentencing of Mr. Ziegler, the court of appeals held that "prior state court
convictions of the defendant, tried as an adult for offenses occurring
when he was a juvenile, could be counted in determining applicability of
federal mandatory life sentence. 20 8
b. Sentencing
Mr. Ziegler contended that "the district court violated his rights to
equal protection under the law when it used Oklahoma drug convictions
both as predicates for the 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)209 enhancement and
as convictions resulting in three criminal history points, each under
U.S.S.G. Section 4A1.2(d). 21 ° Mr. Ziegler argues that "he was treated
200. "A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first
offender and thus deserving of greater punishment." Id. sec. 4A introductory commentary.
201. 204 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2000).
202. McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1287.





208. Id. at 1282.
209. Id. at 1300. See also 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b). 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A) requires a
mandatory life sentence if the defendant committed the instant offense "after two or more prior
convictions for a felony drug offense have become final." 21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(l)(A).
210. McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1300; See also U.S.S.G. Section 4AI.2(d). For offenses committed
prior to the age of eighteen, if the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of
imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3 points under Section 4Al.1(a) for each such
sentence. 4A1.2(d)(1). For any other case, (A) add 2 points under section 4A1.l(b) for each adult or
juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such
confinement within the five years of his commencement of the instant offense; (B) add I point under
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differently than similarly situated persons because some states do not
allow the unsealing of juvenile records, and the states differ on the ages
and crimes for which persons under eighteen can be prosecuted as
adults."21'
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the equal protection claim "under the
rational basis standard to determine whether the challenged sentence was
based on arbitrary distinction or upon a rational sentencing scheme. 21 2
In drug trafficking cases involving fifty grams or more of cocaine base,
21 U.S.C. Section 841(b)(1)(A) 2  requires a mandatory life sentence if
the defendant committed the instant offense after two or more prior con-
214victions for a felony drug offense have become final. Although
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2) provides that juvenile status offenses are never
counted as a prior sentence, the statute requires three points to be added
if the defendant committed the prior offense to the age of eighteen and if
the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of im-
prisonment exceeding one year and one month.21 5
The Tenth Circuit concluded that "the use of Mr. Ziegler's felonies
as predicate offenses for the section 841 enhancement did not deprive
him of equal protection under the law. 216 The court looked at congres-
sional intent and concluded that Congress "left certain aspects of sen-
tence enhancement to the laws of the states and that the language of the
statute tied" the definition of the term felony to the state's clarification of
the crime as a felony."
217
The court looked at Mr. Ziegler's conviction as an adult for the two
Oklahoma felonies. 218 "Although states have different criteria for deter-
mining when a juvenile can be charged as an adult," the court stated that
the different criteria did not "render the sentencing scheme irrational any
more than relying on the state's various definitions of felonies., 21 9 The
court held that "Mr. Ziegler's assertion that similarly situated juveniles
might be treated differently because some states allow the unsealing of
section 4A1.1(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's
commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A). 4A1.2(d)(2).
211. McKissick, 204 F.3d. at 1301.
212. Id. at 1300; Chapman v. U.S., 500 U.S. 453, 465, III S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991).
213. See 21 U.S.C. Section 841 (b)(1)(A).
214. Id. at Section 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
215. U.S.S.G. Section 4AI.2(c) and (d)(l).
216. McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1301.
217. Id. Congress requested the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines to prohibit the abuses and
biases occurring under the system of discretionary sentencing. Dormont, supra note 175. at 1771-
1772. Congress intended for the Guidelines to ensure that courts treat similarly situated defendants
the same. Id.
218. McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1301.
219. Id.
20001
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Like several other circuits, the Tenth Circuit accepted the constitu-
221
tionality of the sentence enhancement provisions without question.
Certain types of prior sentences are generally part of the defendant's
criminal history calculations, however, the circuit courts do not always
agree as to what constitutes an includable prior sentence. 222 In United
States v. Unger,223 the First Circuit ruled that uncounseled juvenile pro-
224ceedings count towards the criminal history scoring. In United States
v. Matthews, 225 the Second Circuit held that, because the state statute did
not eliminate all trace of the prior adjudication and allows consideration
of youthful offender adjudication in later proceedings, a youthful of-
fender adjudication in the state is not an "expunged" conviction for pur-
poses of sentencing under the Guidelines. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the district court properly included the defendant's youthful
offender adjudication in calculating his criminal history category.
In United States v. Asburn,228 the Fifth Circuit held that a juvenile
conviction, automatically set aside under a state statute, properly re-
ceived the prior sentence designation. 229 Finally, in United States v. Bar-
220. Id.
221. See United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282.
222. U.S.S.G. section 4A1.2(c). According to the Guidelines, sentences for offenses such as
hitchhiking, juvenile status offenses and truancy, loitering, minor traffic violations, public
intoxication, and vagrancy do not count towards criminal history scoring. Id. To work around these
constraints the Guidelines "place no caps on the number of points an adult may acquire from his
juvenile record." Dormont, supra note 171, at 1774.
223. 915 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1990). cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104 (1991).
224. Unger, 915 F.2d at 761-62. Unger allegedly engaged in a variety of criminal conduct as a
juvenile, including breaking and entering, receiving stolen goods, and assault and battery. Id. at 763.
In failing to prove this conduct, the state could not convict Unger of these offenses, but instead
found him guilty of being wayward. Id. Two years later, an adult court judge used this wayward
finding to increase his criminal history score, imposing the maximum sentence. Id. at 760.
225. 205 F.3d 544 (2nd Cir. 2000).
226. Matthews, 205 F.3d at 548. The defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. Section 922(g)(1)(1994). Id. at 545. In calculating his sentence, the
lower court used the defendant's youthful criminal adjudications to magnify his sentence under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Section 4A1., 4A1.2. Id.
227. Id. at 548-549.
228. 20 F.3d 1336 (5th Cir.), opinion reinstated in part on reh'g en bane, 38 F.3d 804 (1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1965 (1996).
229. Asburn, 20 F.3d at 1343. The defendant appealed the sentence given to him after he
pleaded guilty to 2 counts of bank robbery. Id. at 1337. The court held that the "set aside" provision
"should not be interpreted to be an expungement under 4A1.20j) in calculating the defendant's
criminal history category". Id. at 1343. The court reasoned that because the youth convictions had
been "set aside for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law" that they were properly used to
calculate the defendant's criminal history category. Id.
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ber,23° the Sixth Circuit upheld a sentence enhancement based on the
defendant's extensive criminal history dating back to the age of
twelve.23' The court accepted the government's contention that the de-
fendant's current criminal history category did not reflect the seriousness
of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that he would
commit other crimes, and thus the court granted the government's mo-
tion for upward departure in sentencing. 232
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held, in United States v. Kozinski,
233
that a sentence of supervision not based on a finding of guilt received
improper consideration as a prior sentence. 34 Yet, in Nicholas v. United
235States, the Supreme Court allowed the use of a prior uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction to enhance the sentence for a subsequent conviction
that did not, by itself, justify imprisonment. 236
These failed challenges to the constitutionality of the use of prior ju-
venile adjudications to enhance adult sentences illustrates that the courts
are resistant to limiting the harsh effects of punitive sentencing on young
offenders and unwilling to consider how the lack of procedural safe-
guards available to juveniles in juvenile courts harm convicted adult of-
237fenders with juvenile records.
5. Analysis
Although juveniles do not have the same due process rights that
adults receive," ' juvenile offense records are regularly used to lengthen
subsequent adult criminal sentences. 239 This trend appears to demand a
higher standard of due process rights, such as the right to a trial by
jury. 40 The McKiever court's decision to deny juveniles the right to a
230. 200 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2000).
231. Barber. 200 F.3d at 914. In addition to his adult record, the defendant had nine juvenile
convictions for which he was assessed no criminal history points. Id. at 909. The court held that the
offenses were properly considered as part of a recidivism inquiry and the sentence increase was
affirmed. Id. at 912.
232. Id. at 910.
233. 16 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 1994).
234. Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 812. The court held that the Sentencing Guidelines made clear that "a
prior sentence is any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt whether by guilty plea,
trial, or plea of nolo contendere." Id. at 911. (citing U.S.S.G. Section 4A1.2(a)(1).
235. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
236. Nicholas, 114 S. Ct. at 1928. The court emphasized that "sentencing courts have not only
taken into consideration prior convictions, but also considered a defendant's past criminal behavior,
even if no conviction resulted from that conduct." Id.
237. See Hunt, supra note 142, at 658-669 (discussing implications for the future of the juvenile
justice system and the effects of recent punitive sentencing).
238. Butts, supra note 121, at 51.
239. Kay Redeker. Comment. Solidifing the Use of Juvenile Proceedings as Sentence
Enhancement and Clarifing Second-Degree Murder, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 483. 486 (1998).
240. Hunt, supra note 142, at 645. "The right to a jury trial allows gives offenders bargaining
power to discuss a plea agreement with prosecutors." furthermore "It may also be more difficult to
obtain the unanimous guilty verdict necessary for a jury to convict an offender that to convince a
200]
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jury trial was based on two assumptions: (1) "juvenile proceedings result
in treatment, not punishment," and (2) "juvenile proceedings will not
detrimentally affect the juvenile when she reaches the age of
majority., 24 ' These assumptions are not accounted for in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.242 Thus, courts upholding the use of sec-
tion 4A1.2(d) base their decision on an erroneous understanding of the
"constitutional underpinnings that allow juveniles dispositions absent a
jury trial. '243 "If a sentence was imposed under the guise of therapy, it
should remain a therapeutic sentence; it should not be allowed to meta-
morphosize into a criminal conviction at the prosecution's
convenience." 24
Because juveniles do not have the same constitutional protections as
adults, arguably, juveniles convicted without a jury or represented by
counsel-unless the jury trial is validly waived-are unconstitutionally
245convicted. Therefore, using such juvenile convictions to enhance later
adult sentences under the Guidelines is called into question.246 The
Guidelines allow courts to use prior juvenile adjudications to enhance
adult sentences by adding points to a defendant's criminal history
score-treating juvenile confinements like adult sentences to the detri-
ment of the adult defendant.247 When juveniles may face additional con-
finement as an adult because of juvenile delinquency, then juveniles are
entitled to the same protection that juries provide to adults.-4 8 However,
commentary in the Guidelines and Supreme Court case law prohibit
courts from using prior unconstitutional adjudications to enhance later
sentences.249 So, if a prior juvenile adjudication is unconstitutional be-
single judge of an offender's guilt" which increases the likelihood that a juvenile will be found
guilty. id.
241. Dormont, supra note 175, at 1790. The McKiever court based its decision on the fact that a
finding of delinquency being significantly different from than a finding of criminal guilt. McKiever,
403 U.S. at 540. The court assumed that the juvenile delinquency proceeding would not stigmatize
the child a criminal. McKiever, 403 U.S. at 552. (White, J., concurring). See also Dormont. supra
note 175, at footnote 105.
242. Id. at 1791. See also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d).
243. Dormont, supra note 175, at 1791.
244. Id. at 1794.
245. Kropf, supra note 188, at 2179. To deny juveniles due process rights, that ensures that
criminal trials are conducted fairly and that similarly situated defendants are afforded the same
constitutional protections, ignores the purpose and intent of the Due Process Clause and the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 2180. "Failure to apply constitutional protections such as due process rights to
juvenile proceedings was justified under the 'legal fiction' of protective confinement and
rehabilitation instead of criminal punishment." Coupet supra note 16, at 1314.
246. Kropf, supra note 188, at 2179.
247. Dormont, supra note 175, at 1792.
248. Id. at 1795.
249. Kropf, supra note 188, at 2179.
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cause the juvenile did not receive fundamental due process rihts, then
under the Guidelines the court cannot 
use the prior conviction.
On the other hand, one could argue that "sentencing adults who
have a significant criminal history as first offenders is tantamount to of-
fering a double discount., 25  "[T]he offender received a discount at the
juvenile level (first juvenile offense) and should not be accorded a sec-
252ond completely fresh start. However, "juvenile priors should not carry
the same weight as adult previous convictions. '253 Perhaps a compromise
would be to use the juvenile record to disentitle an adult of first-offender
status-but not to extend its influence much more than that. 254 In fact,
many sentencing guideline systems do just that, namely, counting juve-
nile adjudications, but with strict limiting standards.
CONCLUSION
"The current juvenile justice system lacks a coherent and consistent
policy on how to deal with juveniles. 256 Although the Due Process
Clause attempts to ensure that criminal trials are fair and that similarly
situated defendants have the same constitutional rights, juveniles do not
257have the equivalent due process rights as adults. But due process issues
258in juvenile adjudications extend beyond the individual juvenile's trial.
When courts use the Sentencing Guidelines to enhance adult sentences,
the courts "unconstitutionally ignores the different protections afforded
the juveniles and the different policies that underpin the juvenile justice
system. 259
Historically, the law protected juveniles, but with a perceived in-
crease in juvenile crime rates and violent juvenile crimes, the prospect of
250. Id.
251. Julian V. Roberts, Article: The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22
CRIME & JUST. 303, 326 (1997). "The importance of targeting repetitive violent offenders is clear
from the juvenile record provisions in many states." Id. at 330. According to a Bureau of Justice
Statistics study the presence of juvenile offenses was one of the most significant predictors of adult




255. Id. "The guidelines in Florida count all prior convictions but only if they occurred within a
three year period proceeding the commission of the primary offense." Id. "In Kansas, the age of the
offender is a determining factor" with juvenile adjudications extinguishing "once the adult reaches
twenty-five years of age." Id.
256. Leta R. Holden, Tenth Circuit Survey: Juvenile Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 843, 856
(1996).
257. Kropf, supra note 188, at 2180.
258. Id.
259. Dormont, supra note 175, at 1770. But see Mills, supra note 14 (arguing that (1) juveniles
have almost all of the constitutional protections given to adult criminals, (2) the Guidelines reinforce
the important goal of recidivism, and (3) by using juvenile crimes to enhance adult sentences, the
Guidelines realistically address the nature and increase of juvenile crime).
2000]
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260a uniform standard by which to treat juveniles seems unpromising.
However, the "get tough on crime" rhetoric has prompted reformers to
enact legislation that threatens to replace the juvenile justice system as a
forum for dealing with juvenile delinquents as adult criminals.26' Sen-
tencing policies, such as Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis in
juvenile cases and the expungement of juvenile records, "threaten to con-
structively dismantle the system that has protected juveniles" and valued
262rehabilitation over punishment. Perhaps in the future new efforts will
begin to reflect the original intent of the juvenile justice system-reha-
bilitation and reform, which are more effective than punishment.
263
Audrey Dupont
260. Bumstein, supra note 29, at 902.
261. Coupet, supra note 16, at 1346.
262. Id. Children are vulnerable to the effects of long sentences in adult prisons and will not
just spend time there but will essentially be raised in the prison environment. See Felcher, supra
note56, at 347.
263. Id.
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